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SEMANTIC SEARCHES
ATHUL K. ACHARYA†
ABSTRACT
Courts and commentators have struggled with the problem of
cabining digital searches while still allowing law enforcement
sufficient latitude to be efficient and effective. This Note examines
current proposals, such as requiring search protocols or abandoning
the plain view doctrine, before proposing a solution of its own:
revisiting the constitutional requirement of particularity in the
warrant. Focusing on particularity is not new; the problem is
describing, ex ante, where to search within a corpus of seized data.
The language of files and folders is both inadequate and incoherent
for this task, but in rejecting it, courts have largely given up on
particularly describing where in the data to search.
Data is information, and information has meaning—semantics.
Computers are increasingly able to sort and segregate data according
to the human meaning it represents. Accordingly, magistrate judges
can describe, ex ante in natural language, the type of data that
examiners may search based on the evidence sought. Forensic
examiners can then use automated tools to retrieve information
responsive to that semantic description without searching the entirety
of the data. Thus, the privacy of suspects, guilty and innocent, can be
protected without giving up the plain view doctrine or compromising
effective law enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION

The advent of electronic storage media (ESM) and electronically
1
stored information (ESI) has confounded the law of search and
2
3
seizure. Can data be “searched”? When does that happen? What is a
4
“particular” warrant or a “reasonable” search? What are the limits
5
on the purview of plain view? The widespread use of ESM and ESI
has resulted in difficult questions going to the heart of the balance
between law-enforcement and privacy interests. Courts have charted
6
a haphazard course through this minefield, generally—though not
always—paying lip service to privacy concerns while allowing law
enforcement unfettered and unprecedented discretion in the
7
execution of searches and seizures.

1. This Note occasionally uses the terms hard drive and data as generic stand-ins for ESM
and ESI, respectively.
2. Compare Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 551–54 (2005) (proposing that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when ESI is exposed to
human observation), with Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment,
163 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2011) (denying that an examination of ESM is a search at
all).
3. See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV.
1241, 1248 (2010) (observing that computer searches entail a physical search and seizure
followed by an electronic search). For one court’s explanation of this two-stage practice, see
infra notes 42–47 and accompanying text.
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that searches not be “unreasonable” and that
warrants “particularly describ[e]” their objects). Compare, e.g., United States v. Hill (Hill II),
459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the requirement that searches must be reasonable
is sufficient to constrain computer searches without more), with id. at 974 (observing that every
file on seized ESM must necessarily be examined (quoting United States v. Hill (Hill I), 322 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1088–89 (C.D. Cal. 2004))).
5. Bryan K. Weir, It’s (Not So) Plain To See: The Circuit Split on the Plain View Doctrine
in Digital Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 83, 92–93 (2010) (observing that spatial and
temporal constraints on the scope of physical searches do not apply to computer searches).
6. Compare, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 1999)
(suppressing the results of a search that exceeded the scope of the warrant and suggesting a
number of techniques to minimize exposure of irrelevant information), with United States v.
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009) (refusing to suppress the results of a very similar
search that used none of those techniques).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62, 66 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that a warrant
“lacked meaningful parameters on an otherwise limitless search of Rosa’s electronic media,”
but was not “so defective that an officer [would] lack a reasonable basis for relying upon it”);
United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006) (purporting to “understand the
heightened specificity concerns in the computer context” and yet refusing to require any such
specificity). But see United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1170,
1174, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating a search, albeit on narrow
grounds); id. at 1178–80 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (proposing extensive ex ante regulations).
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As always in search and seizure law, the tradeoff is between
ensuring effective law enforcement and vindicating legitimate privacy
concerns. The question is how to maintain the balance reached in the
physical realm when conducting search and seizure in the electronic
8
domain. It has become clear that physical rules cannot be
transplanted, unchanged, to the world of digital search and seizure
9
without upsetting that balance. In response, magistrate judges have
recently begun requiring a search protocol in the warrant—
10
prescribing, ex ante, how a computer search is to be executed —but
at least one prominent scholar has attacked this practice on both
11
constitutional and normative grounds.
This Note proposes a way to regulate computer searches that is
both firmly grounded in the Constitution and normatively attractive.
As a starting point, this Note assumes the necessity of broad
12
overseizure of ESI and adopts Professor Orin Kerr’s definition of a
search of data: exposure to human observation, by way of a display,
13
printer, or other output device. This Note proposes that a warrant to
search ESI should be limited to a semantic zone—a nontechnical
description of the type of content an agent may lawfully search, based
on the evidence that the government has probable cause to search for.
As a brief preliminary example, if the government has established
probable cause to search for pay-owe sheets related to drug
trafficking, the appropriate semantic zone to search would be text
14
document and spreadsheet data. This Note further proposes that in
ESI cases, magistrate judges perform a new, supervisory function,
conducted through their traditional role of vetting warrants.

8. See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011) (“When new tools and new practices threaten to expand or
contract police power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth Amendment
protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”).
9. See Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1176 (noting the “serious risk that every
warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the
Fourth Amendment irrelevant”).
10. See infra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part I.B. For a cogent discussion of what it means to “seize” ESI, see generally
Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700 (2010).
13. Kerr, supra note 2, at 551–54.
14. This may seem to be a broad zone, but it would exclude, for example, the suspect’s
videos and pictures. For a discussion of a case in which this would have made a difference, see
infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
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The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part I starts with
a sketch of Fourth Amendment search doctrine concentrating on the
particularity requirement, followed by a discussion of the two-stage
nature of computer searches. Part II introduces two paradigmatic
problems arising from the search of seized ESI and critiques the
solutions proposed so far. Part III argues that the root of the problem
is the lack of particularity in searches of ESI. It then evaluates current
conceptions of ESI and argues that they are inadequate to articulate
particularity limits before proposing a new perspective—the semantic
perspective—which gives rise to semantic zones. Finally, Part IV
explores the application of those rules in various real and
hypothetical test cases.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Searches Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment regulates government searches and
15
seizures. A Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government
violates a personally held and objectively reasonable expectation of
16
privacy. The general rule is that a government search is “per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment” unless pursuant to
either a warrant or one of “a few specifically established and well17
delineated exceptions.” To obtain a warrant, the government must
have probable cause to believe that specific evidence of a specific
18
crime will be found in a specific place. Probable cause is a “fair
probability” under the totality of the circumstances that the search
19
will discover evidence of a crime. The government’s determination
15. The text of the Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). The Supreme Court has recently made
clear that in addition to this test, a search occurs when the government “obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
950 n.3 (2012).
17. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 & n.4 (1990) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 825 (1982)).
18. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).
19. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Supreme Court has consistently refused
to further articulate the contours of the probable-cause standard. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle,
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of probable cause must be vetted by a “neutral and detached
magistrate,” who may, if he agrees that there is probable cause, issue
20
a warrant for the search.
A warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
21
and the persons or things to be seized.” The Framers of the Fourth
Amendment were concerned with preventing the practice of general
warrants used in England, as well as the related writs of assistance in
the Colonies, which authorized the Crown’s customs officers to
rummage through the homes of colonists and seize prohibited or
22
uncustomed goods. The requirement that both the object of the
search and the place to be searched be particularly described in the
23
warrant is the primary safeguard against general searches.
The particularity requirement is a function of what the police
know at the time they seek the warrant. With regard to places, the
24
leading case is Maryland v. Garrison, in which police had probable
cause to search one third-floor apartment but, unaware that the floor
comprised multiple apartments, requested a warrant for the entire
25
floor. The Court held that “if the officers had known, or even if they
should have known, that there were two separate dwelling units on
the third floor . . . they would have been obligated to exclude
26
respondent’s apartment from the scope of the requested warrant.”
Similarly, the object of the search may be described by a “generic
classification[]”—for example, “currency”—but “only when a more

540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of
the circumstances.”); Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 (“The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common-sense decision . . . .”).
20. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
22. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1976); United States v. Marron, 275 U.S.
192, 195 (1927). For a canonical account of the colonies’ experience with writs of assistance, see
generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51–78 (1937).
23. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
24. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
25. Id. at 85.
26. Id. (emphasis added). The Court upheld the ensuing search because the officers had
not, in fact, known, and acted reasonably upon realizing that the floor contained two
apartments. Id.
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precise description is not possible,” as when police do not know every
27
relevant serial number.
Once a search is underway, the object of the search constrains
28
where law enforcement may reasonably search. As the Seventh
Circuit memorably put it, “[i]f you are looking for an adult elephant,
29
searching for it in a chest of drawers is not reasonable.” Thus, even
in the absence of a pinpoint description of where to search within the
particular place, the description of the thing to be seized—itself
particularized by probable cause—limits the scope of the search.
The plain view doctrine is an important exception to the warrant
requirement for seizures. An officer may seize an object without a
warrant as long as three conditions are met: (1) the object has
lawfully come into the officer’s view, (2) “its incriminating character
[is] ‘immediately apparent,’” and (3) the officer has “a lawful right of
30
31
access to the object.” In Horton v. California, for example, the
warrant only authorized a search for the proceeds of a robbery,
32
“including three specifically described rings.” The Court held that
seizure of the weapons used in the robbery did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because they were discovered in the course of a lawful
search, and it was immediately apparent that they were the weapons
33
used in the robbery.

27. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 1980). The canonical test for
“whether a description [of the thing to be seized] is sufficiently precise” is set out in United
States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986):
(1) whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in
the warrant; (2) whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing
officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; and (3)
whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of
the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued.
Id. at 963 (citations omitted).
28. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“The scope of a warrantless
search . . . is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause
to believe that it may be found.”). The search at issue in Ross was warrantless, but the Court
reasoned that the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile, justified by probable cause, is
identical to the scope of the search a magistrate could have authorized in a particular warrant,
justified by probable cause. Id. at 823. Thus, the rule for searches generally is that the object of a
search defines its permissible scope. Id. at 824.
29. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
1999).
30. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 & n.7 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
31. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
32. Id. at 131.
33. Id. at 142.
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Enforcement of the Fourth Amendment is primarily manifested
34
35
in the exclusionary rule —a “judicially created remedy” under
which defendants may move to suppress evidence obtained in
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The primary rationale
for the exclusionary rule is that suppressing illegally obtained
evidence should deter the police from violating the Fourth
36
Amendment, “‘by removing the incentive to disregard it.’”
B. Searches of ESI
The story of ESI searches begins at the “dawn of the information
37
38
age,” with United States v. Tamura, a case about paper records “so
intermingled that they [could not] feasibly [have been] sorted on
39
site.” The Tamura court held that in such a case, officers may seize
all the documents as long as they seal them “pending approval by a
40
magistrate of a further search.” A few years earlier, the Supreme
Court had held that, in searches of intermingled records, it was
unavoidable (and therefore permissible) to examine “some innocuous
documents . . . at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they
41
are, in fact, among those papers [sought].” Thus, the stage had been
set for broad overseizure and modern searches of ESI.
Twenty-four years later, the Ninth Circuit supplied, in United
42
States v. Hill, one of the clearest articulations of the broad
overseizure practice. The defendant, accused of possessing child
pornography, argued that the warrant was overbroad in authorizing
seizure of all ESM instead of only that which actually contained child
43
pornography. The court held that the “significant burden” of

34. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (announcing the exclusionary rule,
albeit in different terms); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 660 (1961) (incorporating
the exclusionary rule against the states).
35. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
36. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
37. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (discussing the lineage of ESI search doctrine).
38. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 595.
40. Id. at 595–96. The Tamura court further held that when the need for broad overseizure
is known ahead of time, officers should inform the magistrate, who should authorize such
seizure only upon determining that “no other practical alternative exists.” Id.
41. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).
42. United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006).
43. Id. at 973.
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44

carrying properly equipped computers with trained personnel and
45
the dangers and difficulties of on-site inspection meant that, as long
as the affidavit gave a “reasonable explanation,” “blanket removal of
all computer storage media for later examination” was quite
46
reasonable. Thus, investigations involving computer evidence occur
in two stages: first, there is a search of a physical place, followed by an
en masse seizure of ESI or ESM; second, there is a search of the
47
seized data for incriminating evidence.
The natural corollary question is how to regulate the subsequent
search of the seized ESI. Until recently, there was no ex ante
regulation of computer searches; courts, reasoning that “‘[t]here is no
way to know what is in a file without examining its contents,’” refused
48
to require restrictions in the warrant. Typically, the caveat would be
affixed that, despite the need for an open-ended warrant, the
49
reasonableness of the search would be reviewed ex post —but at that
50
later stage, the same logic has served to justify almost any search.
44. See id. at 974 (quoting United States v. Hill (Hill I), 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088–89
(C.D. Cal. 2004)) (noting the variety of operating systems, file systems, and media types).
45. Id. at 974–75 (citing the risk of “compromis[ing] the integrity of the evidence by
attempting to access the data at the scene” and the “many hours and perhaps days” that
examining every file might take (quoting Hill I, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1089)).
46. Id. at 976. As Josh Goldfoot, Senior Counsel of the Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section at the U.S. Department of Justice, points out, the reasonable explanation
requirement has merely led to a rise in boilerplate language in warrant affidavits. See Goldfoot,
supra note 2, at 136–37.
47. Kerr, supra note 2, at 547. Kerr offers the following metaphor: “data acquisition refers
to collecting the hay, and data reduction involves looking through the haystack for the needle.”
Id.
48. Hill II, 459 F.3d at 978 (quoting Hill I, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[S]earching the
entire server was necessary . . . because individuals often mislabel directory files, the server
might contain related websites, and the unallocated server space might contain materials
pertaining to those websites.”); United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 239 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding
reasonable a search of a filesharing directory, under suspicion of child pornography, even
though the scope of the warrant was “limited to evidence of financial crimes” because
“criminals can easily alter file names and file extensions to conceal contraband”); United States
v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] computer search must, by implication,
authorize at least a cursory review of each file on the computer . . . .”); United States v. Burgess,
576 F.3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n the end, there may be no practical substitute for
actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders and . . . documents . . . .”); Hill II, 459 F.3d at 978
(“There is no way to know what is in a file without examining its contents . . . .” (quoting Hill I,
322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090) (quotation marks omitted)). Of course, warrants that fail even to link
the search to a particular crime will generally be invalidated. See, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 626
F.3d 56, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2010) (invalidating a warrant that “failed to state with any level of
particularity the specific criminal activity alleged or the type of digital evidence to be sought”);
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Since then, attempts have been made—with varying degrees of
success—to rein in computer searches both ex ante and ex post, but it
is worth examining, first, some of the problems that arose in this
context.
II. TWO PROBLEMS AND SOME SOLUTIONS
Courts and commentators have tended to focus their ire on the
problem of the plain view doctrine—its potential for licensing
51
overbroad, general searches in the context of ESI. If law
enforcement may lawfully view every file, evidence of any crime
discovered will be admissible, as long as its incriminating character is
immediately apparent. But less visible and arguably more perturbing
is the predicament of the innocent suspect. In such a case, the officer
executing the search is, in effect, in the position of proving a
negative—that the seized data does not contain incriminating
evidence—and often has the power to search every file seized to
52
satisfy that condition.
A rigorous solution must address the root of the matter by
cabining the permissible scope of ESI searches. This Part examines
both problems in detail before exploring attempts to solve them,
including scrutinizing the officer’s subjective intent, abolishing the
plain view doctrine altogether, and requiring a search protocol in the
warrant.
A. The Plain-View Problem
The admissibility of any evidence discovered in plain view during
an authorized search revitalizes concerns about the very “general
53
searches” the particularity requirement was supposed to avert.
There is no shortage of “low-level offenses” for which probable cause

United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a warrant that “permitted
the officers to search for anything—from child pornography to tax returns to private
correspondence”—to be overbroad).
51. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. See generally Weir, supra note 5 (analyzing
the circuit split concerning the plain view doctrine).
52. See Hill II, 459 F.3d at 974 (“To be certain that the medium in question does not
contain any [incriminating] material, the officers would have to examine every one of what may
be thousands of files on a disk . . . .”). As discussed in Part II.C.3, magistrates have increasingly
been imposing a search protocol ex ante, but that practice has come under constitutional attack
from at least one prominent scholar. See infra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
53. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469–70 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(noting the tension between the plain view doctrine and the prohibition on general warrants).
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can be “relatively easy to establish,” making it very easy to obtain a
54
warrant to search an “unpopular or politically powerless” target.
The fear is that, having obtained such a pretextual warrant, police
could conduct a general search, seizing evidence of any crime,
55
whether it were in the warrant or not.
In the physical world, the Supreme Court initially addressed such
concerns by requiring a subjective test of the officer’s intent: evidence
unrelated to the justification for the search was inadmissible unless it
56
57
came into plain view inadvertently. But in Horton v. California, the
58
Court changed course and eliminated the subjective-intent element.
“Scrupulous adherence” to the particularity requirement, the Court
held, was sufficient to obviate the possibility of general searches. The
Court reasoned that as long as the warrant particularly described the
place to be searched and the evidence sought, the officer was
59
constrained by the corresponding permissible scope of the search.
Thus, even if the warrant was obtained by pretext, the Court
reasoned that the officer could hardly use it to conduct a general
60
search.
Even in the physical realm, this reasoning only goes so far: a
sufficiently small pretextual “thing” can authorize a thoroughly
61
comprehensive search. In the digital realm, courts routinely accept
the assertion—ex post, at least—that any file may contain the
62
63
evidence sought, fully vitiating the logic of Horton. The

54. Kerr, supra note 2, at 567 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–18 (2001)).
55. Id.
56. Coolidge, 403 U.S at 469. Despite not commanding a majority, Justice Stewart
announced a rule that, within nine years, was largely accepted by lower courts. Linda Novak,
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 774
(1980).
57. For a summary of the facts, see supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
58. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1990).
59. Id. at 140 & n.10.
60. See id.
61. See Weir, supra note 5, at 93 (observing that “a warrant to search a house for stolen
diamonds . . . allows the police to search everything in the house because of the diamond’s small
size”).
62. For examples from the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, see supra note
50. Of course, those same courts maintain that searches must be “limited in scope by the terms
of the warrant’s authorization,” United States v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009), but
this limitation has been given little content.
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invasiveness of physical searches, however, is still bounded by the
amount of time, money, and manpower that law enforcement can
64
bring to bear. Searches of seized ESI, however, encounter
significantly attenuated limits: a single agent can conduct the entire
search, and he may search it at his convenience, over the course of
65
months. Additionally, the agent has powerful tools at his disposal to
66
organize, classify, and explore the data, in contrast to the methodical
way in which a physical search must proceed. Furthermore, physical
67
searches often take place with the suspect or a third party present,
introducing an observer who can testify as to whether the search was
reasonable, whereas computer searches generally occur off-site,
where the only prying eyes are those of the police. Thus, in the digital
realm, both doctrinal and practical hurdles to pretextual searches are
substantially removed; the plain view doctrine allows “an end-run
68
around the particularity requirement” of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Innocent Suspects
The plain-view problem in the context of ESI is highly visible to
the judiciary because there is evidence of a crime and a defendant to
69
challenge the search. But the lack of limits on searches of a suspect’s

63. For a discussion of one court’s attempt to rein this in, see infra Part II.C.1. For a
discussion of search protocols, which significantly alleviate the problem but may be
unconstitutional, see infra Part II.C.3.
64. Kerr, supra note 2, at 569 (observing that when searching a physical location, “[a]
search team must be organized and trained; the location must be controlled during the
execution of the search”).
65. Weir, supra note 5, at 93 (“Instead of many officers searching a house in haste, a single
analyst can peruse a hard drive extensively and at his leisure, providing a low-cost search
without time constraints.”).
66. See Robyn Burrows, Note, Judicial Confusion and the Digital Drug Dog Sniff:
Pragmatic Solutions Permitting Warrantless Hashing of Known Illegal Files, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 255, 260 (2011) (“[Forensic] programs ‘index’ the imaged hard drive by organizing files
into a searchable format. Using [forensic software], an examiner can perform keyword searches,
recover deleted material, flag encrypted files, and analyze altered files.”); Wayne Jekot,
Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the Particularity Requirement, PITT. J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y, Spring 2007, at 1, 45, available at http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php
/tlp/article/view/29/29 (discussing forensic software packages).
67. See, e.g., Burrows, supra note 66, at 284–85 (noting that the presence of the individual
being searched is a check on drug-dog sniffs).
68. Weir, supra note 5, at 87.
69. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 787 (1970) (noting that the Supreme Court “review[s] the conduct
of police almost exclusively in criminal cases where the defendant is the asserted victim of police
misconduct”).
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data should be more troubling when the suspect is actually innocent,
because the natural stopping point for the search is the last file on the
70
computer. The Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Walser helps
illustrate the issue.
In Walser, the police had probable cause to search the defendant
Walser’s hotel room for “evidence of the possession of controlled
71
substances,” and received a warrant to that effect. The officer who
executed the search found a computer, and began exploring its
72
contents in the room. He found and opened some JPEG picture
files, apparently suspecting that they might contain “images of drug
73
use.” Upon discovering that they were, in fact, adult pornography,
he seized the computer “in anticipation of conducting a more
74
thorough search” off-site.
Once off-site, the officer navigated to the documents directory of
a spreadsheet program, ostensibly continuing the search for “address
books, spreadsheets, [and] databases” that might provide evidence of
75
drug transactions. Out of “approximately ninety files and four subfolders,” however, he chose to open a movie file and discovered that
76
it contained child pornography. Walser argued that opening the
movie exceeded the scope of a warrant for records of drug
transactions; the government countered that a computer search
77
warrant authorized the search of every file.
The court was unwilling to announce quite so broad a rule.
Seeking to avoid suppression, it emphasized the “restraint” the officer
showed by subsequently requesting a second warrant rather than
continuing to “rummage”—but implicitly, it held that opening a
movie file was within the scope of a warrant for evidence of drug
78
transactions. This is a stretch, but even assuming that the officer
70. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 983. The magistrate issuing the warrant was not actually aware of the presence of
a computer, id. at 983 n.1, but the warrant authorized, among other things, searching for
“records, and/or receipts, written or electronically stored, income tax records, checking and
savings records, records that show or tend to show ownership or control of the premises and
other property used to facilitate the distribution and delivery [of] controlled substances,” id. at
984 (alteration in original).
72. Id. at 984.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 984–85.
77. Id. at 987.
78. See id.
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expected to find that Walser had conveniently taped himself
participating in a drug deal—and was not merely curious about
Walser’s pornography tastes—it should be troubling when one
79
considers: What if Walser had been innocent?
When a suspect is innocent, there is no contraband to be found.
However, having seized all of his data, there is no check to prevent
zealous law enforcement from expanding an initially fruitless search
into increasingly less pertinent areas, in search of evidence that is not
80
there. If privacy is to have any meaning, this cannot be reasonable,
and in theory, law enforcement is disincentivized from doing so by the
81
threat of suppression. But, as Walser shows, in the electronic domain
that threat is simply not forthcoming. Ex post review is highly
deferential when an expanding search does eventually uncover
82
evidence of some crime. On the other hand, as long as the suspect is
innocent, he will never know the extent of the intrusion to challenge
it. The predicament of the innocent suspect—that his privacy is
regulated by rules developed in the context of guilty suspects—is a
familiar one, but it is profoundly magnified in the digital domain by
the power of broad overseizure.
C. Solutions
The problem with the plain view doctrine in the digital realm—
that it removes the penalty for a general rummaging search—is but a
symptom of the larger malaise: the police have the ability and,
generally, the authority to rifle through an entire hard drive in search
of evidence. As demonstrated by the problem of the innocent suspect,
83
this is an unacceptable incursion on privacy interests —even when a
fishing expedition is not the motive. This state of affairs has not
escaped judicial and critical notice. This Section describes and
critiques the three solutions that have been proposed. The first two
79. He was not: marijuana and related paraphernalia were found in the room. Id. at 984. It
is unclear whether he was ever prosecuted on that score.
80. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1123, 1133 (1996) (“The Constitution seeks to protect the innocent. The guilty, in
general, receive procedural protection only as an incidental and unavoidable byproduct of
protecting the innocent because of their innocence.”).
81. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
82. For further examples, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
83. See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 75, 81 (1994) (“The variety of information commonly stored on a computer, and
the enormous and ever-expanding storage capacity of even simple home computers, justifies the
highest expectation of privacy.”).
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tackle only the plain view doctrine; the third attempts to address the
core privacy concern, but runs into constitutional and normative
difficulties.
1. Inadvertence Requirement. An early response that focused on
the plain-view problem was to effectively reinstate the subjectiveintent element for evidence discovered in plain view during searches
of ESI. The oft-cited precedent in this line of decisions is United
84
States v. Carey. In Carey, the defendant was being investigated for
85
possession and sale of cocaine. The police obtained a warrant to
86
search his computer for information relating to drug transactions.
The agent was unable to find any relevant files through keyword
87
searches, but did notice some image files. He opened the first one,
discovered it contained child pornography, “developed probable
cause to believe the same kind of material was present on the other
image files,” and proceeded to open several others without obtaining
88
a new warrant. The court held that his discovery of the first file was
inadvertent and therefore admissible, but, because he then
“temporarily abandoned” the authorized search for evidence of drug
trafficking and embarked on an unauthorized search for child
89
pornography, the court suppressed the latter files.
In reinstating the inadvertence requirement for plain-view digital
evidence, the court recognized that, in the digital context, the
reasoning of Horton fails—the plain view doctrine can indeed “be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
90
another until something incriminating at last emerges.” However,
Horton’s criticism of the inadvertence requirement remains apt for
three main reasons. First, focusing on the “subjective state of mind of
the officer” is still a poor way to achieve evenhanded law

84. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Mann,
592 F.3d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 2010) (giving some weight to the officer’s inadvertence in affirming
the lower court’s admission of evidence under the plain view doctrine); United States v.
Schlingloff, No 11-40073, 2012 WL 4378148, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2012) (interpreting Mann as
requiring inadvertence).
85. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1270.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1271.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1283 & n.4.
90. See id. at 1272 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
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enforcement, and the scope of a valid search is better defined by the
92
object of the search. Second, Horton is still good law, and Carey is
93
hard to square with it. Finally, the plain-view problem is the
symptom but not the disease—even with an inadvertence
requirement, the police may still scour all of a suspect’s data as long
as they demonstrate their intention not to rummage by getting a
94
second warrant when they find something unexpected.
2. Abolishing the Plain View Doctrine. A second approach,
proposed by Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit and some
scholars, is to eliminate the plain view doctrine entirely for electronic
95
searches. This is strong medicine that cuts deeply into the societal
interest in crime control, and needs correspondingly strong
96
justification. The idea seems to be that if the only evidence usable in
a prosecution is that related to the justification for the search, then a
fishing expedition cannot possibly yield any dividends. This
justification is unrealistic, may even be counterproductive, and still
fails to address the base privacy concerns.
First, given the reality of broad overseizure and off-site search,
97
the cost of an exploratory search is quite low, but the returns can be
enormous. Even if unrelated evidence cannot be used directly, the
police are now aware of it. That bell cannot be unrung. As with all

91. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). For example, given two searches that are
identical from the point of view of the suspect, the admissibility of plain-view evidence would
depend on the inherently unreliable determination of the officer’s subjective state of mind. In
addition, a subjective-intent inquiry would have the perverse effect of excluding evidence which
the police had some expectation of finding, but not on evidence sufficient to constitute probable
cause.
92. Id. at 139–40.
93. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself may be retreating from this doctrine. See United States
v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009) (suggesting that Carey be limited to its facts).
94. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.
95. E.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) (“Magistrate judges should insist that the
government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.”); Kerr, supra
note 2, at 576–84 (arguing that “the best way to neutralize dragnet searches is to rethink the
plain view exception in the context of digital evidence”); Weir, supra note 5, at 113 (“[C]ourts
should act as the Ninth Circuit did and abolish the doctrine’s application to digital searches.”).
96. See Lily R. Robinton, Courting Chaos: Conflicting Guidance from Courts Highlights the
Need for Clearer Rules To Govern the Search and Seizure of Digital Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 311, 344 (2010) (“Abolishing the plain view doctrine with respect to digital searches may
create risks to society that outweigh those created by governmental intrusion into individual
privacy.”).
97. See supra notes 64–68.

ACHARYA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

10/9/2013 3:51 PM

408

[Vol. 63:393

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

applications of the exclusionary rule, if the purpose of the search is
something other than eventual prosecution—such as embarrassment
or harassment—excluding plain-view evidence would have no effect
98
on police incentives. Alternately, the police may use that evidence to
further an investigation, as long as the evidence eventually introduced
in court is sufficiently attenuated or might inevitably have been
99
discovered. Thus, a pretextual warrant can pay significant dividends.
Second, abolishing the plain view doctrine may actually be
counterproductive. The advantages for law enforcement of the plain
view doctrine are obvious, but it is good for privacy interests, too. The
plain view doctrine incentivizes police to constrain their search: the
reward for “scrupulous adherence” to the permitted scope of search is
the admission of any evidence not in the warrant but found in plain
100
view. If the police are “undeterred by a potential loss of plain-view
evidence,” there will be no concern about invasiveness to balance the
101
zealous pursuit of evidence. Indeed, for this reason, abolishing the
plain view doctrine may be worse for innocent suspects.
Third, regardless of the motives of the police—whether the
warrant is legitimate or pretextual—abolishing the plain view
doctrine does nothing to address the basic problem of protecting
legitimate expectations of privacy after broad overseizure. This is also
why a related proposal, that data irrelevant to the investigation
should be sequestered by a third party, preferably independent of the
102
government, is not useful—the privacy violation occurs regardless
103
of who is employing the violator. To be fair, however, Chief Judge
Kozinski’s proposal included a very privacy-protective doctrinal
modification: search protocols.

98. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881,
918 n.79 (1991) (“When the motivation for the police conduct is not evidence-gathering, the
exclusionary rule imposes no cost on the police officer, and consequently cannot deter
misconduct.”).
99. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37, 539 (1988).
100. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1990). The question of the permissible
scope of a search of ESI is, of course, fundamental and contested. Under current rules, see supra
Part I.B, the scope is everything seized.
101. Weir, supra note 5, at 105.
102. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).
103. When combined with a search protocol, as in Chief Judge Kozinski’s proposal, such a
rule makes some sense, as it “keep[s] as many eyes off non-seizable information as possible.”
See Weir, supra note 5, at 104.
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3. Search Protocols. In 1994, Professor Raphael Winick, noting
that searches of ESI are likely to involve “large quantities of personal
information . . . intermingled with relevant information,” presciently
proposed that warrants include a search protocol: “an outline of the
methods that [investigators] will use to sort through the
104
information.” Carey, though best known for reintroducing the
inadvertence requirement, also quoted extensively from Winick’s
105
work, and in the past decade, federal magistrate judges around the
country have increasingly required that a search protocol be attached
106
to a computer warrant. In 2010, Chief Judge Kozinski urged
magistrate judges to “insert[] a protocol for preventing agents
involved in the investigation from examining . . . data other than that
107
for which probable cause is shown.”
At first glance, search protocols make a lot of sense. Because
they preclude forensic officers from trawling through the entirety of
the data looking for evidence, search protocols prevent the plain view
doctrine from effectively authorizing general searches in the digital
world, much as the particularity requirement prevents the plain view
108
doctrine from doing so in the physical world. For the same reason,
search protocols also protect the innocent suspect from the exposure

104. Winick, supra note 83, at 107–08.
105. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *7 (D.
Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012); In re U.S.’s
Application for Search Warrant To Seize and Search Elec. Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770
F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152–53 (W.D. Wash. 2011); In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp.
2d 953, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2004); In re Search Warrant, 2012 VT 102, ¶ 7. The search protocol in
Ganias is typical, and authorized the following techniques:
(a) surveying various file “directories” and the individual files they contain
(analogous to looking at the outside of a file cabinet for the markings it contains and
opening a drawer believed to contain pertinent files);
(b) “opening” or cursorily reading the first few “pages” of such files in order to
determine their precise contents;
(c) “scanning” storage areas to discover and possibly recover recently deleted files;
(d) “scanning” storage areas for deliberately hidden files; or
(e) performing key word searches through all electronic storage areas to determine
whether occurrences of language contained in such storage areas exist that are
intimately related to the subject matter of the investigation.
Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *7.
107. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1179.
108. Chief Judge Kozinski proposed to include search protocols as well as to eliminate the
plain view doctrine and require third-party segregation of data. Id. at 1180; see Weir, supra note
5, at 103–05. Such an approach would arguably confer stronger privacy protection in the digital
realm than in the physical realm.
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of all of his data to government eyes. Unlike the other attempted
solutions, search protocols address the privacy problem directly.
Kerr has argued, however, that specifying a search protocol in
109
the warrant is neither constitutionally permissible nor good policy.
His constitutional argument relies on four cases, in nonelectronic but
plausibly analogous settings, holding, respectively, that warrants need
110
not necessarily specify a method of execution; that agents may
disregard an express knock-and-announce requirement—that is, a
111
protocol for the search—so long as their actions are reasonable; that
the particularity requirement extends only to the place to be searched
112
and the property to be seized; and that a magistrate judge, having
issued a warrant for probable cause and with particularity, may not
113
further involve himself in its execution. Taken together, these cases
at least cast doubt on the putative binding effect of a search protocol;
Kerr believes that they “point to the conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment does not permit ex ante restrictions on the execution of
114
computer warrants.”
Kerr further argues that search protocols, despite their laudable
115
goal of protecting individual Fourth Amendment interests, are in
fact poor policy. He argues that search protocols are essentially ex
116
ante attempts to regulate reasonableness, which, in the absence of
concrete facts, must be little more than guesses as to what will be
117
reasonable. In fact, he reasons, search protocols can inhibit the
development of rules for reasonable computer searches ex post, by

109. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1246.
110. See id. at 1264–66 (discussing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979)).
111. See id. at 1268–71 (discussing Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997)).
112. See id. at 1267–68 (discussing United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 (2006)).
113. See id. at 1261–64 (discussing Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979)).
114. Id. at 1271. However, the only court to examine this argument thus far has found that
these cases support not the proposition that search warrants are unconstitutional, but “two more
modest conclusions: that ex ante evaluation by a judicial officer cannot wholly supplant ex post
assessment of law enforcement conduct and that hard and fast rules about what a warrant must
and must not include are generally frowned upon.” In re Search Warrant, 2012 VT 102, ¶ 24
n.11. For another very narrow reading of these cases, see generally Paul Ohm, Massive Hard
Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1
(2011), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2011/03/20/ohm.pdf.
115. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1247 (stressing that his argument is “about means rather than
ends”).
116. Id. at 1277.
117. See id. at 1279 (“[The reasonableness] standard requires courts to ‘slosh [their] way
through the factbound morass’ . . . .” (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 383 (2007))).
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focusing litigation on compliance with the protocol rather than
118
directly on the reasonableness of the search. Thus, even if search
protocols are constitutionally permissible, he asserts, magistrate
119
judges should avoid them.
III. PARTICULARITY AND PERSPECTIVE
Kerr has proposed abandoning ex ante limitations on computer
searches altogether, leaving the problem of protecting privacy to the
120
requirement that searches be reasonable. But that requirement has
121
thus far been wholly vacuous. Proponents of search protocols have
the right idea—enunciating ex ante bounds to prevent the privacy
violation before it occurs. The problem is that search protocols are
the wrong implementation—they regulate how a search is executed,
rather than where and for what. The Constitution explicitly
contemplates a kind of ex ante restriction, which computer searches
122
have been entirely lacking: particularity.
This Part argues that the key to vindicating privacy interests in
the new digital reality lies in the Fourth Amendment requirement
that warrants specify a particular place to be searched. The first
Section explores the particular need for particularity as an ex ante
check on police action in the digital realm. The second Section
evaluates different ways of conceptualizing data, with particular
attention to conceptualizing data as places. The final Section proposes
a new way to think about data—the semantic perspective, which
conceives of data as consisting of domains of meaning. It then
examines the rules that emerge from this perspective, explores the
advantages of this approach, and attempts to anticipate some
objections.

118. Id. at 1289.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 1247 (“[L]imitations . . . on the execution of computer warrants . . . should be
developed and identified in ex post challenges.”).
121. See supra Part I.B. Notably, Kerr’s proposed rules for reasonable searches would
eliminate the plain view doctrine. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1287.
122. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 4 (“[Search protocols] are designed to cure the manifest
lack of probable cause and particularity in almost every computer case.”); see also In re Search
of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958–59 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting the special
particularity concerns for computer searches because of broad overseizure).
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A. Particularity is Particularly Necessary
The constitutional requirement of particularity in the warrant, an
ex ante limit on the scope of a search, has doctrinal and normative
functions that are particularly important in the context of computer
warrants. Doctrinally, it explicitly requires ex ante limits customized
to the particular case at hand in addition to the general requirement
of reasonableness. Normatively, it guides the reasonable execution of
searches by informing and alerting all the relevant actors in a given
search—the police, the judiciary, and the suspect—to the particular
privacy interests at stake. Because police can seize all of a suspect’s
data and search it later, both are crucial.
1. Particularity and Doctrine. The Fourth Amendment, “even
more than its fellows, . . . was the product of particular events that
123
closely preceded the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” The
primary thrust of the Amendment was prohibiting general searches,
124
implemented by the requirement of particularity in the warrant.
Indeed, in contrast to the modern focus on the requirement that
searches be reasonable, state constitution precursors to the Fourth
Amendment “seem[] to show that the general principle [that searches
must be reasonable] was stated merely as a basis for the minor
premise condemning general warrants and that the abuse attempted
125
to be prevented was that of general warrants only.” And yet, as one
scholar has noted, “[c]omputer search warrants are the closest things
to general warrants we have confronted in the history of the
126
Republic.” Computer warrants specify neither what to seize nor
127
where to search.
Rules of reasonableness, developed ex post at trial or on review,
are a general sort of rule—they apply to any search that presents the

123. TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1969).
124. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
125. LASSON, supra note 22, at 81 n.10; see also id. at 79 n.3 (quoting the Virginia Bill of
Rights’ precursor to the Fourth Amendment, VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. X,
which only prohibited general warrants and made no mention of reasonableness); id. at 81 n.12
(quoting the Maryland clause, MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XXVI, which also
prohibits general warrants without mentioning reasonableness); id. at 101–03 (noting that the
House of Representatives never voted on the current phrasing of the Fourth Amendment, and
the version that was voted upon did not prohibit unreasonable search and seizure per se).
126. Ohm, supra note 114, at 11.
127. See supra Part I.B.
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The particularity
predicate fact-pattern during its execution.
requirement is different: it generates rules that are tailored to the case
at hand and cabin the search before it is executed. The point of the
particularity requirement is to define the outer bounds of the search
using the information available ex ante, that is, the facts establishing
129
probable cause. If that information can support a more particular
description of the place or the thing for which there is probable cause,
130
then the warrant must be more particular. Particularity, probable
cause, and the magistrate constitute the essential ex ante trifecta of
the Fourth Amendment—a “neutral and detached” third party, not
“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
131
crime,” ensuring that there is “a fair probability that contraband or
132
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Normally, “scrupulous adherence” to the particularity
requirement in the warrant—and the corresponding permissible
133
scope of the search—justifies the plain view doctrine. This is why
doctrinal changes that aim to “solve” the plain-view problem are
operating at the wrong level: the root of the problem is that
134
particularity in computer search warrants has thus far been missing.
It is not sufficient that computer warrants merely state the evidence
sought or the crime committed. Given the reality of broad
overseizure and the absence of conventional checks in an off-site
135
search of ESI, that leaves entirely too much to the discretion of the
searching agent, who may explore as much of the data as is necessary

128. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1279 (“For each set of facts, the courts articulate what the
officers can do and cannot do as they execute the warrant.”).
129. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (holding that a particular warrant
must “limit[] the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is
probable cause to search”).
130. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 824 (1982) (“[P]robable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage
will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom . . . .”); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant.”).
131. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
132. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added).
133. See supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.
134. See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 962–63 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(“[W]hat the government seeks is a license to roam through everything in the computer without
limitation and without standards. Such a request fails to satisfy the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
135. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
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to find the evidence sought. But if the thing to be seized cannot be
specified with any particularity, computer warrants must limit the
place within ESI that the agent may search. Otherwise, the plain view
doctrine will become a license for general searches and fishing
137
expeditions in the digital realm.
2. Normative Function. The Supreme Court has explained that in
physical searches, particularity helps the suspect understand the
138
justification for the search and its corresponding bounds. In the
context of digital evidence, in which broad overseizure is the norm,
the police and the judiciary, too, must be aware of the justifiable
extent of the search. Accordingly, in addition to the doctrinal need
for particularity in the warrant, particularity plays a normative role
that is critical in the digital realm.
First, particularity alerts law enforcement to the fact that
although a broad array of information has been seized, the
investigation has a substantially narrower scope, and the suspect has
not relinquished his legitimate privacy interests in information
139
outside that scope. Short of eliminating broad overseizure, this is
the single greatest protection that can be afforded the innocent
suspect, who will almost never be able to vindicate his privacy rights
140
before a judge. Rather than weigh an abstract notion of privacy
against the need to expand the search to find the expected evidence,
the officer will have an independent, objective judgment as to how
141
far, concretely, the privacy violation is justified.
Second, particularity is an aid to the judiciary ex post in
evaluating whether the scope of the search was truly reasonable.
136. Cf. LASSON, supra note 22, at 54 (“The writ [of assistance] empowered the officer and
his deputies and servants to search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to
be, and to break open any receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye.”).
137. Accordingly, search protocols, for all their flaws, can be viewed as an attempt to
regulate the place that can be searched. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 9–10 (noting that the
Fourth Amendment requires that the place to be searched be particularly described and arguing
that search protocols satisfy this requirement).
138. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004).
139. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 5 (observing that probable cause typically only exists for a
small portion of the seized data); id. at 7–8 (noting that computers store increasing amounts of
increasingly sensitive data).
140. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *3 (D.
Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012) (discussing a
complicated chain of custody for Ganias’s data, wherein each recipient was notified of the
appropriate zone of search authorized by the magistrate).
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When, as is usually the case for ex post review, evidence of some
crime was found, the objective judgment of the proper scope ex ante
helps to balance the natural ex post bias in favor of law
142
enforcement. It provides a critical backdrop against which to
143
evaluate the steps law enforcement took —or, alternately, vindicates
those steps by virtue of additional warrant requests that serve as a
144
coarse public record.
Third, “[a] particular warrant also ‘assures the individual whose
property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
145
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’”
Specifically for computer warrants, particularity helps assure the
suspect that despite the broad overseizure of his data, his every word
and deed is not open to examination by the authorities. Particularity
limits, supported by probable cause, vetted ex ante by a magistrate,
are a cornerstone of the lawful use of police power; when the actual
seizure is far broader than the “things” for which there is probable
cause, the importance of particularity in searching within those things
is correspondingly much greater. The obvious question, then, is what
well-formed, constitutional, ex ante particularity limits look like in
the electronic world.
B. Perspectives on ESI
To talk coherently about limits, it is necessary first to decide
what ESI looks like—how it should be perceived. It takes little
imagination to conceive of data as comprising a place, or rather,

142. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1291 (“[E]x ante review of probable cause and particularity
ensures that the assessment of the government’s interest is unbiased by the eventual discovery
of evidence or contraband in the place to be searched.” (citing Stuntz, supra note 98, at 916,
934)).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam) (marking the government’s “callous disregard” of a warrant’s
search protocol and limited scope).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1094–95 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Hughes
immediately closed the gallery view when he observed a possible criminal violation outside the
scope of the warrant’s search authorization and did not renew the search until he obtained a
new warrant.”); Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *6 (observing, using a search protocol as a proxy
for place-particularity, that the agents “viewed only data that had been extracted according[]” to
the search protocol, and that, when the agents needed to expand their search, they applied for a
second warrant).
145. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
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multiple places, not all of which must be searched. Most people
have asked themselves, at some point: “Where did I put that file?”
The harder question is: What do those places look like? The choice of
perspective ripples throughout the application of Fourth Amendment
147
148
doctrine, impacting the definition of a search, the zone of a search,
and, importantly, the language available for a magistrate to articulate
limits ex ante. There are essentially three perspectives that have been
propounded thus far: the filesystem perspective, the exposure-based
perspective, and the physical perspective.
1. The Filesystem Perspective. The most intuitive way to think
about computer data is in terms of how the filesystem and operating
149
system structure it. Under this conception, the physical hard drive is
a container; it contains folders and files, each of which is a separate
150
container that may contain more containers. This perspective is
attractive because it comports with the physical metaphors that
computers use to represent data: “files,” “folders,” “the desktop,”
151
and so on. In addition to the intuitive familiarity of this perspective,
it is attractive because it appears to allow traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine to transfer with minimal changes to the digital
152
realm. This promise has not been borne out.
The basic idea is that if data is a series of nested containers, then
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine concerning closed containers
153
should apply in the digital realm without more. Thus, a search

146. See Jekot, supra note 66, at 35 (“Computer storage devices do not contain just one
place; they hold multifarious data, such as metadata and user and system files and folders, in
numerous small spaces, including bits and bytes and slack and unallocated spaces.”).
147. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
148. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 554 (“The zone of a search determines the extent to which a
particular search in a space eliminates privacy protection elsewhere in that space.”). This is
distinct from the scope of a search. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
149. This has variously been called “the subcontainer perspective,” Goldfoot, supra note 2,
at 118–20, and the “virtual file” approach, Kerr, supra note 2, at 554–57.
150. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 119.
151. See ANDY RATHBONE, WINDOWS XP FOR DUMMIES 20 (2d ed. 2004) (“You can create
files and folders right on your new electronic desktop . . . .”).
152. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 123–24 (noting efforts “to render the existing physical
rules abstract, and then use them to govern forensic examiners’ work”); Ohm, supra note 114, at
5 (describing the common Fourth Amendment analogy from computers to filing cabinets).
153. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 555 (“If you analogize a computer hard drive to a suitcase,
each file is like its own individual zippered pocket in the suitcase.”).
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occurs when a container (a folder or a file) is opened; the zone of
the search is the entire container, so having opened a file, for
155
example, the police may view as much of it as they would like;
and—herein lies the rub—the only language available to limit a
search ex ante is the language of files and folders. Of course, the
police are not usually familiar with the suspect’s file organization or
naming scheme ex ante, and accordingly warrants simply elide ex ante
156
limits altogether. But the structure of the filesystem has little to do
with the probable cause for the search—viewed through the lens of
157
files and folders, there is probable cause for every subcontainer.
Thus, the filesystem perspective is the source of the plain-view
158
problem.
Furthermore, many files are themselves containers, such as
159
160
161
database files, “page files,” and Windows Registry files, so they
have high evidentiary value because they are repositories for
162
multifarious data from different sources. For instance, if a website is

154. See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that opening
files can expand the scope of a search).
155. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 556 (observing that the filesystem perspective would permit
an officer to expose every page of a hundred-page open document).
156. The argument for eliding limits is similar to the one for broad overseizure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Forcing police to limit their
searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way would be much like saying
police may not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ or
‘talcum powder.’”); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The government
knew that Evans had sent 19 images directly to Hay’s computer, but had no way of knowing
where the images were stored.”).
157. Hay, 231 F.3d at 635 (“[T]he inquiry . . . is whether there was reasonable cause to
believe the 19 files from Evans’s computer were located somewhere in Hay’s computer . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
158. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 149 (observing that the filesystem perspective, with the
plain view doctrine and without search protocols, turns ESM into “a single unit, in practice
incapable of meaningful subdivision”).
159. See, e.g., 14.5. The MyISAM Storage Engine, MYSQL 5.5 REFERENCE MANUAL,
http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.5/en/myisam-storage-engine.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013)
(explaining that MySQL, a popular database program, using MyISAM, a popular storage
engine, stores the database as three files, one of which contains all the data, which is subdivided
into tables).
160. See MARK E. RUSSINOVICH & DAVID A. SOLOMON, WINDOWS INTERNALS PART 1, at
15 (6th ed. 2012) (“Because most systems have much less physical memory than [they need], the
memory manager transfers . . . some of the memory contents . . . to disk [to] free[] physical
memory so that it can be used for other processes or for the operating system itself.”).
161. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 127.
162. See id. at 129–30 (“One file can mix a drop of responsive data into a sea of
unresponsive material—just as a hard drive can.”).
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stored as a database and there is probable cause to search the activity
of one user, the filesystem perspective does not differentiate between
searching his data and searching the entire database; as long as the
163
database is one file, probable cause to search some of the file is
164
indistinguishable from probable cause to search all of the file.
Finally, ESM includes data that is not stored in files and folders
at all, but either as part of the filesystem or outside of it. The first type
165
of data is known as metadata, and includes the file name, owner,
166
and creation and access times. The second is unallocated space,
167
which will often include remnants of deleted files. Both of these can
be highly valuable to the forensic examiner, but the filesystem
168
perspective simply breaks down when considering them. Thus, the
filesystem perspective is not merely inadequate but in fact incoherent
for describing zones of privacy on ESM.
2. The Exposure-Based Perspective. Kerr has proposed an
exposure-based conception of searches of ESI that rectifies some—
but not all—of the problems with the filesystem perspective. Under
this conception, exposure of data to human observation is a search,
and the zone of a computer search is coterminous with the extent of
169
the information exposed. Thus, every action that exposes new
information—such as scrolling down a spreadsheet or querying a
170
table from a database—is a new search. This approach has the
advantage of capturing searches that expose metadata or deleted files,
as well as properly treating files that are themselves subcontainers as
171
“containing distinct zones of privacy.” However, it does not solve

163. See id. at 130 (“A SQL database, holding all of a dynamic web site’s data, might be a
single file.”).
164. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
165. See DOMINIC GIAMPAOLO, PRACTICAL FILESYSTEM DESIGN 10 (1999) (“[Metadata is]
information about the file that is not in the stream of bytes that make up the file.”).
166. Id.; see Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 128–29.
167. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 128.
168. Id.
169. Kerr, supra note 2, at 556–57.
170. Id. The distinction between the zone of the search and the scope of the warrant
becomes important here; most of the time, a warrant that authorizes searching part of a file will
authorize searching all of it. Id. at 557.
171. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 116; see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (criticizing officers for not being more selective in the portions of a
spreadsheet they viewed).

ACHARYA IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

SEMANTIC SEARCHES

10/9/2013 3:51 PM

419

the particularity problem—it provides no new vocabulary to describe
zones of privacy ex ante.
3. The Physical Perspective. Goldfoot has recently proffered a
third perspective, under which a hard drive is viewed as nothing more
172
than another physical object, like a blood sample or a pair of jeans.
It is not searched at all; once lawfully seized, it is merely
173
“examined.” Under this perspective, concerns like zone of search
and particularity simply fade away. ESI is treated not as distinct from
174
ESM, but merely as physical properties of ESM that happen to
175
reveal information. Thus, the examiner need not “worry[] about
176
whether his next mouse click will violate the Bill of Rights.”
The physical perspective is conceptually perhaps the cleanest
perspective on ESI thus far, but that cleanliness comes at the cost of
abandoning any restrictions on searches of seized ESM. Goldfoot
contends that calls for such restrictions are essentially policy
arguments rather than arguments about what level of protection is
177
constitutionally required. But unlike the private information that
178
jeans can carry, like the wear level on a right-side pocket, much of
the data ESM carries are not epiphenomena of existence; they are
179
intentionally created works, intentionally stored there. A single
one-by-one-half-inch USB stick could store its owner’s journal,
rolodex, calendar, to-do list, shopping list, “bucket” list—indeed, lists
of every shape and form—library card, entire libraries, music, films,
receipts, correspondence, accounts and finances, photo albums—all
180
sorts of “papers” and “effects” —and the physical perspective would
172. See Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 150 (providing an admirable exegesis of the variety of
information that can be deduced from a pair of jeans).
173. Id. at 157.
174. As Goldfoot acknowledges, when the suspect’s ESM is imaged on-site, as this Note has
assumed throughout, the physical perspective is less clear about what constitutes a seizure. Id. at
158–60.
175. Id. at 155.
176. Id. at 157.
177. See id. at 160 (“At some point, the debate between the subcontainer and physical
perspectives becomes a public policy debate.”); id. at 166 (arguing that the
“increase[d] . . . threats to public safety” posed by the growing use of computers “might warrant
a change in law enforcement’s favor”).
178. See id. at 150 (“A worn right pocket suggests [the owner] favors that hand.”).
179. See Ohm, supra note 114, at 8 (“Our computers track what we read, buy, where we go,
and increasingly, what we think.” (emphasis added)).
180. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing protection for “papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures”); Winick, supra note 83, at 81 (“The intangible nature of
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present the entire corpus to law enforcement for their perusal, on
181
probable cause for any pretextual crime. This is not a policy
182
argument; the policy choice is enshrined in the Fourth Amendment.
Even for inadvertently created data, which might be likened to
the information that can be gleaned from a pair of jeans, the sheer
scale of the potential privacy invasion makes ESM qualitatively
183
different without more. That is particularly true when one considers
that ESM often stores both intentionally and inadvertently created
data of other parties not suspected of crime—perhaps hundreds of
184
other parties —a fact that is becoming increasingly salient with the
rise in cloud computing, wherein one’s “email messages, word
processing documents, voice mail messages, and business data [are
commingled] on shared servers alongside the data of innumerable
185
strangers.” Finally, the physical perspective treats computers, cell
phones, and so on, as simply self-contained pieces of plastic and
silicon—but they are networked machines, and searching one can
186
reveal information well outside its physical boundaries. The physical
perspective is thus no more coherent than the filesystem perspective.
C. The Semantic Perspective
On the one hand, the physical perspective conceives of ESM as
one monolithic zone of privacy, wholly forfeited once seized, despite
widely held expectations of privacy that society is almost certainly

computer data does not affect the analysis, since the Court has long recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects ‘intangible as well as tangible evidence.’” (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 305 (1967))).
181. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
182. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[T]he enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”).
183. Consider, for example, inadvertently created records like chat logs, which store
verbatim every careless word typed to a friend. Chat History, GOOGLE CHAT HELP,
http://support.google.com/chat/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=161925 (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).
184. It is telling that the Ninth Circuit’s highly privacy-protective framework was conceived
in the context of a system that stored sensitive data concerning “hundreds of players in Major
League Baseball (and a great many other people),” for only ten of whom the government had
probable cause to search. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162,
1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per curiam).
185. Ohm, supra note 114, at 7 (quoting Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1176)
(quotation marks omitted).
186. See, e.g., Washington v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461, 463 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a
police officer’s impersonation of a suspect by using a seized cell phone to send text messages).
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187

“prepared to recognize as reasonable.” On the other hand, the
filesystem perspective recognizes that seized data holds multiple
zones of privacy, but it attempts to describe those zones using a poor
proxy—files and folders. This Section proposes a new perspective, the
semantic perspective, that does away with the proxy. When the
domain of search is information, the particular place within it must be
described semantically.
1. Semantic Zones.
The semantic perspective is directly
responsive to the problem with broad overseizure, in that all of one’s
content is seized, but only some types of content could reasonably
188
contain the evidence sought. Accordingly, a semantic zone is the set
of areas on a hard drive that responds to a particular semantic
description—in other words, those areas that contain a particular type
of content. Thus, semantic descriptions are articulated not in
structural or technical terms, but in natural language, as descriptions
of content. For example, image-related data, as applied to a particular
hard drive, describes a semantic zone: it is the set of areas on the
drive that contain image-related content, including image files,
metadata for image files, application data for image-editing software,
189
fragments of image files in unallocated space, and so on. All of
these things, in terms of human meaning, are image-related data.
190
The meaningfulness of a semantic description can vary broadly,
and semantic zones can be nested and overlap. For example, guiltrelated data is a conceivable semantic zone—the set of areas on the
hard drive containing evidence of a suspect’s guilt—but finding that
set of areas requires a very deep understanding of the meaning of the
191
data, either via human inspection or a perfect forensic tool. On the
other hand, image-related data is much less meaningful and
192
accordingly much more amenable to automated extraction. The
meaningfulness of a given semantic description thus has important
187. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quotation marks
omitted).
188. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
189. A search continues to be defined as exposure of data to human observation under this
perspective, as such exposure almost always involves exposing the meaning of the data.
190. “Meaningfulness,” here, refers to the extent to which the description refers to the
underlying meaning of the data.
191. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570 (discussing a hypothetical “Perfect Tool” that could
“magically locate evidence described in a warrant”).
192. For examples of tools that can automatically extract data responsive to a semantic
description, see infra notes 199–205 and accompanying text.
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implications for its workability, but for now, the key point is that
semantic descriptions describe zones on a hard drive that, in the
language of the Fourth Amendment, can operate as a “place to be
193
searched.”
2. The New Rules of Particularity. A computer warrant that
meets the particularity requirement should describe one or more
semantic zones for which there is probable cause. For example, when
the probable cause is for child pornography, the warrant might
authorize a search for image-related data; evidence of tax fraud would
support a warrant for spreadsheet data; evidence of unauthorized
access, source code and shell scripts; and so on.
The police should not search—that is, expose to human
194
observation—data outside the authorized semantic zones. The
suspect retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in those semantic
zones not related to the investigation. Thus, for example, a warrant
for spreadsheet data will support searching Registry entries
concerning Microsoft Excel, but not necessarily adjacent entries, and
certainly not fragments of image files in unallocated space or the
creation time of a movie file. On the other hand, because semantic
zones constrain computer warrants and searches—just as particular
places do in the physical realm—in a manner tailored to the
information available ex ante, the plain view doctrine remains viable
195
in the digital realm.
There is an inherent tension in these rules: How are the police to
know what parts of the hard drive correspond to a given semantic
196
description without looking at them? The definition of a Fourth
Amendment search in the digital realm is exposure to human
197
observation. The corollary is that law enforcement is free to employ
unlimited automatic tools to analyze ESI without running afoul of the
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
194. This is not dissimilar to the rule governing the reasonable scope of physical searches,
but here, by virtue of the semantic zone, some authority is shifted to the magistrate. See infra
notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
195. For a practical example, see infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text. In general,
when a warrant specifies a particular semantic zone, as long as the officer “scrupulous[ly]
adhere[s]” to that limitation, the plain view doctrine cannot be used to conduct a general search.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
196. Cf., e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he warrant
impliedly authorized officers to open each file on the computer and view its contents, at least
cursorily, to determine whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s authorization.”).
197. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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198

Fourth Amendment. There is an abundance of such tools—tools
that sort and categorize data without human intervention—that law
199
enforcement can use: keyword search, file-header “magic tests” that
200
determine a file’s format regardless of filename, natural language
201
202
203
search, hash matching, image signature recognition, optical
204
205
character recognition (OCR), and many more. The ability of
computers to automatically segregate data by the type of content it
206
represents is only improving. Law enforcement can use such tools to

198. An important question, outside the scope of this Note, is whether law enforcement can
run certain automatic analyses on all seized data regardless of why it was seized; for example,
whether they can check every hard drive they seize for known child pornography. See infra note
202. The Supreme Court has said that “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a
prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560 (1976) (emphasis added), but also that “[o]fficial conduct that does not compromise
any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search,” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)
(quotation marks omitted), and that “governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of
contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest,” id. at 408 (quotation marks omitted).
See generally Burrows, supra note 66 (analogizing child-pornography dragnets to dog-sniff
searches per Caballes). This Note, however, concentrates on the use of automatic searches to
limit privacy violations outside the parameters of probable cause.
199. See Winick, supra note 83, at 108 (advocating keyword searches to limit the scope of a
warrant).
200. See FILE(1), FREEBSD GENERAL COMMANDS MANUAL (Oct. 9, 2008),
http://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=file&manpath=FreeBSD+9.0-RELEASE
(last
visited Sept. 9, 2013) (using a magic number in the header of a file to divine a file’s format, even
if it has been misnamed).
201. E.g., About Wolfram|Alpha, WOLFRAM|ALPHA, http://www.wolframalpha.com/about.
html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (accepting search queries in “[f]ree-form natural language
input”); Siri, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ios/siri (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“Ask Siri to do
things just by talking the way you talk.”); cf. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138 (asserting that
automated techniques cannot catch “unanticipated wording, an egregious misspelling, an
unexpected foreign language, [or] recently invented slang”).
202. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, ACCESS DATA 25 (Oct. 2, 2012), https://adpdf.s3.amazonaws.com/FTK4-1_UG.pdf (describing the “Known File Filter,” which
“compare[s] file hashes in a case against a database of hashes” to either eliminate irrelevant files
or pinpoint known contraband, like child pornography).
203. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TINEYE, http://www.tineye.com/faq#how (last visited
Sept. 9, 2013) (using a “unique and compact digital signature or ‘fingerprint’” to match images).
204. See Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 72 (“The Optical Character
Recognition (OCR) process lets you extract text that is contained in graphics files. The text is
then indexed so that it can be[] searched[] and bookmarked.”).
205. See, e.g., id. at 73 (detailing an Explicit Image Detection feature that scores files
according to their likelihood of containing “possibly illicit content”).
206. See, e.g., Samy Bengio, Large-Scale Visual Semantic Extraction, in NAT’L ACAD.
ENG’RS, FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING: REPORTS ON LEADING-EDGE ENGINEERING FROM
THE 2011 SYMPOSIUM 61 (2012) (presenting an algorithm to describe an image in natural
language from a dictionary of one-hundred thousand or more terms); Hao Tang, Vivek Kwatra,
Mehmet Emre Sargin & Ullas Gargi, Detecting Highlights in Sports Videos: Cricket as a Test
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determine, without executing a Fourth Amendment search, the areas
207
of ESM that are responsive to a given semantic description.
The fact that semantic zones are not continuous should be of no
concern; neither are files. The filesystem breaks files up into blocks,
which can be placed anywhere on the disk—a “file” is simply an
abstraction provided by the filesystem to present the data to
208
programs and to the user as a single continuous piece of data. The
filesystem perspective is one superstructure for organizing the
209
arbitrary block-level layout of the data. The semantic perspective is
simply another superstructure, but one that has the fortuitous
property of being able to describe zones of privacy—semantic
zones—ex ante.
210
Semantic descriptions should be construed narrowly, but law
enforcement can broaden the search by applying for a second

Case, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MULTIMEDIA
EXPO 1, 1 (2011) (presenting an algorithm to automatically “detect[] highlights in sports
videos” in a sport-neutral way using a variety of machine-learning techniques (emphasis
omitted)). See generally Ajay J. Joshi, Fatih Porikli & Nikolaos P. Papanikolopoulos, Scalable
Active Learning for Multiclass Image Classification, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN
ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 2259 (2012) (presenting techniques to train large
image-classification systems with minimal training samples).
207. This should not be read as an argument in the form of “technological solutionism.” See
generally EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013). Some semantic descriptions will be too “meaningful”
for computers ever to effectively isolate responsive data, such as guilt-related data. See supra
notes 190–93 and accompanying text. Magistrates should take care to stay abreast of
developments in technology that can impact how meaningful a semantic description can
workably be. Of course, if the authorized semantic zone turns out to be unworkably finegrained, the investigating officer can always explain this in an affidavit requesting a broader
warrant, see infra Part IV.A.3, or the officer may be protected by the plain view doctrine, see
infra Part IV.B. The key point, once a minimum level of technology has been reached—which it
has, see supra notes 199–206—is that semantic zones provide an operable and permissible
approach to particularizing computer search warrants, regardless of the technology used or
available.
208. See GIAMPAOLO, supra note 165, at 11 (“A file appears as a continuous stream of bytes
at higher levels, but the blocks that contain the file data may not be contiguous on disk.”).
209. As a practical matter, the semantic zone filenames should always be implicitly
authorized, to allow forensic tools to present the responsive areas in a meaningful way.
Similarly, if the facts of the case require exposure of data stored in a file-level subcontainer,
such as a database, the structural information in that file (for databases, the schema) should also
be authorized to allow automated queries to meaningfully return narrow portions of the file.
See, e.g., HECTOR GARCIA-MOLINA, JEFFREY D. ULLMAN & JENNIFER WIDOM, DATABASE
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 2, 14 (2000) (explaining that a schema is “a description of the
structure of the data in a database”).
210. For example, a warrant authorizing image data ought not to be construed to include
video data, although it might include animated GIF files.
AND
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warrant. On the one hand, narrow construction incentivizes law
enforcement to use the best tools available to sequester
nonresponsive private data, deploying their powerful forensic tools to
211
protect, rather than compromise, a suspect’s privacy. On the other
hand, if information outside the authorized semantic zone is relevant
to the investigation, if ESM cannot be carved up as finely as the
magistrate envisioned, or if searching within the authorized zone
reveals evidence of another crime, the police should simply apply for
a second warrant, supported by probable cause, to expand the search
212
to a new (and still particular) semantic zone.
The corollary of this rule is a more ongoing, supervisory role for
the magistrate—a role necessary in the presence of broad overseizure.
In the physical realm, the police must make real-time decisions about
the scope of a search, checked for reasonableness ex post; that level
of discretion is both necessitated and justified by the real-time nature
of the search. In the digital realm, the converse is true. On the one
hand, the off-site nature of a search of seized ESI makes it possible to
impose greater limits on the scope ex ante, because those limits can
213
be tweaked as the facts of the case develop. On the other hand, to
guard against abuse of the awesome power of broad overseizure, it
becomes necessary to interpose “a neutral and detached magistrate”
between “zealous officers” and a decision to expand the zone of

211. Semantic zones effectively require law enforcement to use the closest-available
approximations to Professor Kerr’s “Perfect Tool.” See Kerr, supra note 2, at 570. Accordingly,
it is the semantic breadth of the description, rather than the technical, filesystem-level breadth,
which should be construed narrowly. By contrast, the technical dimension of semantic zones
should be construed broadly—if a given file is responsive to a semantic zone description, so is its
metadata, the configuration or temporary cache data for the application that created it, and so
on, thus avoiding some of the pitfalls of the filesystem perspective. See supra notes 165–68 and
accompanying text.
212. Goldfoot complains about “empty formality” second-warrant requirements that
generate affidavits such as: “I saw child pornography on that hard drive; therefore, I submit
there is probable cause to believe there is child pornography on that hard drive.” Goldfoot,
supra note 2, at 145. This type of second warrant should be rare with semantic zones, because if
one image falls within the authorized semantic zone, the rest likely do as well. See infra notes
264–67 and accompanying text.
213. Whereas “exigent circumstances” justify eliding the warrant requirement and
concomitant objective review of probable cause, Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 n.7
(1990), off-site searches present positively leisurely circumstances. See In re Search of 3817 W.
West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“[W]hen the government wishes to search a
computer hard drive in the controlled environment of a laboratory, it is not confronted with a
rapidly evolving and sometimes dangerous situation that must be addressed on the spot.”).
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search. Effectively, some of the real-time discretion in whether to
215
search for “an adult elephant . . . in a chest of drawers” is
withdrawn—no longer checked for reasonableness ex post, but
limited in the warrant ex ante, subject to expansion with probable
cause. Thus, the off-site nature of the search is converted from a
liability for privacy interests into an asset.
3. Objections. At the outset, it must be noted that any limit on
police investigations will mean that some crimes go undetected. That
is the price of having a Fourth Amendment—that is, of barring
general searches and protecting innocent suspects. The semantic
perspective draws the boundary of a search, as is traditional, around
216
data for which law enforcement has probable cause. In any case, as
long as the suspect is not innocent, the semantic-zones approach
largely mimics the computer forensic methods already in use by law
enforcement; the first stroke of an investigation is often to separate
217
the relevant from the irrelevant. Additionally, the ability to obtain a
new warrant if probable cause is established for an additional
semantic zone ensures that law enforcement is hardly hamstrung.
Semantic zones, therefore, protect innocent suspects from a
thoroughgoing search of their data far more than they prevent the
discovery of evidence.
Goldfoot, however, asserts that automated techniques are
218
insufficient to segregate data for which there is probable cause. His
argument is mostly targeted toward simplistic techniques such as
214. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). On the distinction between the
second-warrant applications discussed here and the magistrate’s participation in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.
v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), see infra note 230.
215. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
1999). There are significant operational similarities between the semantic-zones approach and
the reasonable scope of a physical search. The key observation in both situations is that law
enforcement can get some idea of what an area might reasonably contain before searching it,
and that regulates their discretion to search it. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
216. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (asserting that crime control and privacy
should be balanced using “the textual and traditional standard of probable cause”).
217. Cf. Burrows, supra note 66, at 260–61 (noting that once a forensic software loads an
image of a hard drive, it indexes the data along various axes including file type, keyword, and so
on); Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 76–77 (describing different ways to refine a
search of digital evidence). For example, in United States v. Ganias, the “first attempted search .
. . yielded too many results for a practicable review,” leading the agents to “narrow the search of
the data” for reasons entirely unrelated to privacy concerns. United States v. Ganias, No.
3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396, at *4 (D. Conn. June 24, 2011), appeal docketed, No.
12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012).
218. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 137–38.
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keyword and filename searches, but modern forensic tools are far
more sophisticated, increasingly capable of identifying the meaning
219
represented on a given area of ESM. For semantic zones to work,
all that is necessary is that a minimum level of technology be available
220
to automatically classify data. Of course, magistrates should keep in
mind the changing capability of computers to understand human
221
but any
meaning when writing semantic descriptions,
miscalculations on that score can be dealt with by applying for a new
222
223
warrant or under the plain view doctrine.
Goldfoot further asserts that, even with sophisticated tools, the
art of computer forensics is not amenable to mechanization, “because
forensics is detective work . . . [which] involves applying background
224
knowledge, intuition, and professional judgment.” Happily, the
semantic-zones approach withdraws none of these faculties from
forensic examiners. A semantic zone includes not only areas that are
directly responsive to the zone description, but also areas that hold
225
ancillary data like metadata and configuration data. The only
restriction is that inferential leaps that take the examiner outside the
226
zone of established probable cause must be vetted by a magistrate.
4. Semantic Zones Versus Search Protocols. Semantic zones
avoid the constitutional and normative hazards that, as Kerr pointed
227
Semantic zones, unlike search
out, afflict search protocols.
protocols, mandate no particular method of search, but merely
219. See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text. In particular, the repeated canard that
“much evidence could escape discovery simply because of [the defendant’s] labeling of the files
documenting [his] criminal activity,” United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir.
2006), simply does not hold water. None of the techniques enumerated above rely on the files’
labeling. This is not like “saying police may not seize a plastic bag containing a powdery white
substance if it is labeled ‘flour’ or ‘talcum powder,’” United States v. Hill (Hill II), 459 F.3d 966,
978 (9th Cir. 2006), but more like requiring that the police test it with a machine to investigate
whether it is cocaine, rather than take a bump.
220. See supra note 207.
221. For a concrete discussion in the context of a child pornography investigation, see infra
notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
222. See infra Part IV.A.3.
223. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.
224. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138.
225. See supra note 211.
226. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[T]he usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence [must, under the Fourth Amendment,] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
227. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text.
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restrict the search to particular areas of the hard drive. It is only as a
corollary of how those areas are identified (by human meaning) and
how “searching” data is defined (exposure to human observation)
that the forensic process (using automated techniques to locate the
semantic zone) is constrained. Thus, there is no ex ante attempt to
228
“guess what would be reasonable.” A semantic zone warrant
restricts the search using only information available ex ante—the
229
probable cause for the search in the first place. Kerr’s constitutional
arguments are also largely inapplicable for the same reason—the
Constitution requires ex ante restrictions on the “particular place” to
be searched, and semantic zones fill that doctrinal and normative gap
230
for searches of ESI.
Much like semantic zones, search protocols aim to identify the
class of data relevant to the investigation; unlike semantic zones,
search protocols go on to dictate how agents may locate that class of
data. This difference does have important ramifications. In United
231
States v. Ganias, for example, Ganias was not initially a suspect, but
rather a third party whose computer may have contained tax data
incriminating the targets of the investigation. Accordingly, the search
protocol limited the search to data “intimately related to the subject
232
233
matter of the investigation” —essentially a very meaningful
semantic zone. The warrant also specified how the agents should find

228. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1277–78, 1287 (summarizing his basic normative argument against
ex ante limits).
229. Cf. Kerr, supra note 3, at 1277 (decrying search protocols as “error-prone ex ante
judicial review” whose utility diminishes as rules of reasonableness are developed ex post).
230. Kerr’s discussion of Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York may require further distinguishing.
See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1261–64. In Lo-Ji Sales, the local magistrate accompanied the police
officers in the execution of the search of an adult bookstore, purporting to determine on-site
which materials to seize for probable cause for obscenity. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319, 322–23 (1979). The Supreme Court invalidated the warrant and seizure for two
reasons: because the open-ended warrant was insufficiently particular and because the
magistrate had abandoned his “neutral and detached posture” and “allowed himself to become
a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation.” Id. at
325–27. By contrast, semantic zones cut back on the generality of computer warrants. Even
though the magistrate is involved in a sort of supervision, that involvement is mediated through
the traditional process of warrant applications. Indeed, multiple courts have expressly relied on
the officer’s having applied for a second warrant, upon discovering probable cause to search
what was effectively a new semantic zone, in upholding the search. See supra note 144.
231. United States v. Ganias, No. 3:08CR00224(AWT), 2011 WL 2532396 (D. Conn. June
24, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 12-240 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012).
232. Ganias, 2011 WL 2532396, at *7.
233. Id. at *7. For an explanation of “meaningfulness” in this context, see supra notes 190–
93, 207 and accompanying text.
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that data: manual techniques such as “cursorily reading the first few
‘pages’ of . . . files in order to determine their precise contents,” as
234
well as automated techniques such as “key word searches.”
On the one hand, such manual techniques allow very meaningful
semantic zones to be specified, which can further protection of the
suspect’s privacy; automated techniques would likely not have been
able to differentiate between Ganias’s tax data and that of the entities
under investigation. On the other hand, search protocols often
involve manual techniques to locate relevant data—effectively,
peeking at it—that provide little guidance to law enforcement and can
severely undercut any privacy-protection goals. In addition, the
search warrant here could be read to forbid advanced automated
techniques not known to the magistrate—precisely the concern of
235
scholars like Professor Kerr.
IV. TEST CASES
At this point, some examples may help illustrate how semantic
zones will work. The primary question ex ante will be what semantic
zone ought to be authorized given the information available. The
nature of the crime, changes in technology, the way the information is
stored, and information that the police can gather without actually
searching the data will all be factors in that determination. Ex post
suppression litigation will likely focus on whether the evidence was
actually within the authorized semantic zone, and if not, whether it
falls within the plain view doctrine. This Part tackles each question in
turn, using the facts of various real and hypothetical cases.
A. The Appropriate Semantic Zone
236

In United States v. Storm, Storm’s then-girlfriend informed the
police that she had found child pornography in the defendant’s
237
recently viewed files. The magistrate issued a warrant to search all

234. Id.
235. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1287 (“Ex ante restrictions effectively delegate the Fourth
Amendment to magistrate judges, transforming Fourth Amendment litigation away from an
inquiry into reasonableness and towards an inquiry into compliance with the magistrate’s
commands.”).
236. United States v. Storm, No. 3:11–cr–00373–SI, 2012 WL 3643845 (D. Or. Aug. 23,
2012).
237. Id. at *1.
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of the ESM, which the court upheld. Recall that the warrant must
only authorize search of the particular area for which there is
239
probable cause. Under the semantic-zones approach, the question
is: In what place—what semantic zone—was there probable cause to
240
search?
On the one hand, the entire hard drive would certainly have
been too broad—there was no probable cause to search, for example,
Storm’s calendar or tax returns, because they could not reasonably
have contained child pornography. Authorizing such a search would
be akin to authorizing the search of a chest of drawers for an adult
241
elephant. On the other hand, Storm argued that the search should
242
be limited to the files his girlfriend saw, his recently viewed files.
That would certainly have been too narrow; it was quite probable that
he possessed more than what his girlfriend discovered. There was
probable cause to suspect that, in his image and video data, he
possessed child pornography—that is the appropriate semantic zone.
That would authorize law enforcement to scan his hard drive for
image and video headers and view any responsive files (including
243
misleadingly named files), fragments of files, recoverable deleted
files, or files inside “compound files such as ZIP, email, and OLE
244
files,” but not to review his other documents for miscellaneous
245
criminality. Storm is a relatively simple case. Other fact patterns can
give rise to harder questions, explored below.
1. Changing Technology. What about narrowing the semantic
zone in Storm further, by limiting the search to pornographic image
and video data? This is a workable semantic zone—modern forensic
tools already have the capability to return only images likely to be

238. Id. at *11.
239. See supra notes 24–27.
240. See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
241. Cf. Platteville Area Apartment Ass’n v. City of Platteville, 179 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
1999).
242. Storm, 2012 WL 3643845, at *11.
243. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 545 (“Software can locate image files . . . by searching for file
headers characteristic of known types of picture files. . . . The file header remains unchanged
regardless of the extension placed on the file, . . . [and] file header characteristics can be located
in slack space or in partially deleted files . . . .”); supra note 200 and accompanying text.
244. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 60.
245. See United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) (suggesting that without such
limits, officers “might review expense reports, income-related files and correspondence, and
federal filing information in search of evidence of tax evasion”).
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246

pornographic. An even narrower semantic zone could be conceived:
child-pornographic image and video data. The potential for a
semantically narrow description will increase with the ability of
computers to understand human meaning, but magistrate judges
should be aware of technological limitations when requiring
semantically narrow zones; a too-meaningful semantic zone, like guilt247
related data, will not be workable. Here, although there is not yet
technology that can specifically identify child-pornographic images
248
while excluding legal pornography,
limiting the search to
pornographic image data is technologically feasible and would avoid
exposure of embarrassing but legally insignificant photos.
2. Structured Data. The potential for a semantically narrow
description will also vary with the degree of structure the data is
249
given. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. provides
illustrative facts. The government had probable cause to believe that
ten baseball players were using illegal steroids, but the records they
sought were kept in a Microsoft Excel-format spreadsheet containing
the drug-testing records of hundreds of other players “and a great
250
many other people.” The warrant only authorized search of the
251
Excel spreadsheets are basically
records of the ten players.
unstructured—even though columns and rows may be labeled, there
is no programmatic association between those labels and the
associated data. That is, there is no way to “query” an Excel
spreadsheet for information only about one person. Once the
spreadsheet is open, all the data is visible. Thus, the semantic zone
252
drug-test results for specific players was unworkable.
246. See Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 182 (explaining the Explicit Image
Detection feature).
247. For a discussion of the variable meaningfulness of semantic descriptions, see supra
notes 190–93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of technological solutionism and the
generality of the semantic-zones approach, see supra note 207.
248. Of course, the technology does exist to identify specific, known images of child
pornography. See supra note 202.
249. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (per curiam).
250. Id. at 1166.
251. Id.
252. There are a few contingent facts that have been omitted for simplicity. As Judge Bea
noted in his concurrence, large spreadsheets are usually not displayed in their entirety, and in
this case, it was possible to “seize” the data in the authorized semantic zone without exposing
the incriminating data as to other players. Id. at 1180–81. The search warrant also included a
number of other procedural safeguards that the government brazenly ignored, such as initial
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By contrast, modern relational-database systems store data in a
structured way, using a user-defined schema that attaches labels to
253
and establishes interrelationships within the data. Such databases
are not accessed by exposing the entire file, but rather through
queries that selectively return information based on particular
254
parameters. Essentially, had the Comprehensive Drug Testing data
been stored in a relational database, it would have been perfectly
255
natural to expose data player by player, and accordingly far more
workable to authorize the narrow semantic zone drug-test results for
specific players.
3. Broadening the Search. One common complaint from those
who oppose restrictive warrants for digital evidence is that privacyprotective restrictions will allow clever criminals to evade detection.
Goldfoot insists that automated techniques will not catch, for
256
example, “pictures of documents.” But this is patently false; modern
forensics software includes OCR technology that can recognize and
257
extract text in images. The harder question is what agents ought to
do when, for example, in connection with tax fraud, a warrant
authorizes searching text-document and spreadsheet data, but the
clever fraudster has hidden his incriminating documents in images,
258
which are off-limits.
Suppose the agents develop a suspicion, based perhaps on the
abundance of image files and dearth of incriminating data, that this is
the case. According to the warrant, the agents may not search the
image data—but that regulates exposure only to human observation.
They may run a combination of OCR analysis and keyword search on
the images, and any resulting match is new evidence with which they
can request a second warrant to search image-related data. The
general principle is that when the authorized semantic zone is
unavailing but the government remains suspicious, automated
segregation of the data by personnel not involved in the case, to avoid exposure of data for
which there was no probable cause. Id. at 1168–69. Thus, here, the results were suppressed.
253. GARCIA-MOLINA ET AL., supra note 209, at 2, 14.
254. Id.
255. See ROBERT SHELDON & GEOFF MOES, BEGINNING MYSQL 250–52 (2005) (describing
how to select particular rows to view from a MySQL database).
256. Goldfoot, supra note 2, at 138.
257. Forensic Toolkit User Guide, supra note 202, at 72.
258. See, e.g., United States v. Evanson, No. 2:05-CR-805-TC, 2007 WL 4299191, at *5 (D.
Utah Dec. 5, 2007) (describing evidence stored in image files, albeit only because the suspect
was “transforming his operation into a paperless type office”).
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analyses can be run on the rest of the data to justify broadening the
search.
4. Physical Crime, Digital Evidence. Sometimes the connection
between the suspected crime and the expected evidence will be more
oblique than with tax fraud or child pornography. Drug trafficking is
a good example—the evidence tends to be physical, such as “cash . . . ,
[m]arijuana, [c]ocaine, [m]ethamphetamine, or other illegal
259
controlled substances, along with associated paraphernalia.” Some
types of evidence that “tend to show conspiracy to sell drugs,”
however, such as “pay-owe sheets, address books, [and] rolodexes,”
260
are increasingly stored electronically.
As indicated in the
Introduction, this type of evidence is likely to turn up in spreadsheets,
text documents, and data files for electronic address books. But,
having seized all of a suspect’s data, agents may assert a need to
search more attenuated semantic zones such as image data, averring
that drug traffickers sometimes take “trophy photos,” or “pictures of
a person holding the controlled substance in front of a stack of
261
money.” Obviously, looking through all of a suspect’s photos entails
a deep intrusion upon his privacy, and, in such cases, magistrates
should evaluate the strength of the evidence presented against the
breadth of the proposed semantic zone in making the probable-cause
determination. At the end of the day, the magistrate has broad
discretion as to how intrusive the search may be—and, as a “neutral
and detached” third party, that is exactly with whom the discretion
262
should lie.
B. Suppression Litigation
The question whether a particular piece of evidence was found
within the authorized semantic zone will be most contentious when
the semantic zone is narrow, and either the technology is not able to
draw such fine lines or the data is insufficiently structured. It is again
263
useful to consider Comprehensive Drug Testing. Suppose the
259. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting a search
warrant).
260. Id. (quoting a search warrant).
261. Id. at 1084.
262. See supra note 226.
263. For the facts of the case, see supra notes 249–52 and accompanying text. For the
purposes of this discussion, again, ignore the contingent facts discussed above, see supra note
252.
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government opened the lawfully seized spreadsheet and the
incriminating nature of hundreds of rows for hundreds of players was
264
immediately apparent. This is essentially an application of the plain
view doctrine, and the key question will be whether the incriminating
265
evidence lawfully came into the government’s view.
Much as in the traditional scope of search analysis, the test in this
case should be reasonableness—whether the government could
266
reasonably have viewed the ten rows without exposing the rest. In
an Excel spreadsheet, this is typically not the case. By contrast, had
the data been stored in a relational database, it would have been
trivial to craft a query that returned only the results for the players
for which the government had probable cause, and if the government
had chosen instead to dump the data en masse, that would have been
267
unreasonable and the evidence should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Scalia wrote in Arizona v. Hicks, “[T]here is nothing
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all”; the
appropriate question is “where the proper balance should be
268
struck.” The arguments presented here could be adapted to call for
an end to broad overseizure as well, substituting on-site, automatic
269
assessment and seizure of responsive areas of ESM. This Note, on
the other hand, accepts that forensic analysts cannot effectively apply
270
their “art” without the expediency of broad overseizure. But the
power to seize everything and search it later is both awesome and
terrible, and if we have decided, as a society, to allow it in the interest
of preventing crime, there must be an equally significant check to
264. As Judge Bea’s opinion highlights, the incriminating nature was not immediately
apparent—the agents had to expose more data first. United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1180–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Bea, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
265. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
268. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1986).
269. At least one author has suggested something along these lines. See Jekot, supra note 66,
at 46–47 (“[A] new ‘best practices’ search warrant should authorize the on-site search for a
particular class or classes of data, and seizures of only the data that is relevant to the crime
being investigated.”).
270. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 547 (“[I]t is . . . difficult to plan a computer search ex ante;
the search procedures are . . . more of an art than a science.”).
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271

ensure against its abuse. Semantic zones are the right check. They
are constitutionally grounded, effective, and responsive to the basic
apprehension about broad overseizure: that once “back [in] the lab,”
272
the government will “have a good look around” without being
particularly—well, particular.

271. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“Power is a heady thing; and
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted.”).
272. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (per curiam).

